

“THE DEATH PENALTY”: REPRESENTATION OF THE TREATY OF SÈVRES IN THE ISTANBUL PRESS IN 1920

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I. Introduction:

The Treaty of Sèvres is a stillborn political event. Strangely, its stillborn character did not decrease its importance and it can be seen probably the most mentioned treaty of the Ottomans in contemporary political discussion in Turkey. This fame has even created a new term called the Sèvres Syndrome, referring to possible decay of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish nation by the impact of ‘foreign powers’ and their ‘partners inside Turkey.’ The syndrome is especially associated with Turkey’s long-standing headaches such as problems with Armenia and other historical issues, the Kurdish issue, and the chronic tensions between secularism and religious conservatism (See Guida, 2008; Yılmaz, 2009). Media contents can be accepted as historical resources (Kanat, 2012). However, the study does not aim to find new historical facts about the Treaty of Sèvres. The study seeks to uncover how the issue of the Treaty of Sèvres -as a devastating phenomenon- portrayed in the Istanbul press. In brief, the study aims to answer this

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main research question: 'How did the Istanbul press of 1920 represent the Treaty of Sèvres?'

There are several devastating treaties in the Ottoman history. However, the Treaty of Sèvres is a unique one. It is a traumatic document for Turks. Experienced in the last 100 years, many Turks were already sent off from the Balkans and now, according to the Sèvres Syndrome, even Anatolia is in danger and Turks' last home could also become under the control of foreign powers. The striking point making the Turkish state of mind uncertain has to do with the reality of the Treaty. Notwithstanding the Sèvres were not executed, it was not just an idea or a plan. The Sèvres was an official document, proposed and signed by Western powers to annihilate the Turkish existence in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Western Anatolia, and even maybe in Istanbul in the long run (Akşin, 2010).

This study seeks to dig a less studied area of Turkish press history and uncover how a crucial crisis period of the Ottoman Empire, just before the downfall, was discussed in the capital of Empire. Ottoman press history is mostly uncovered in Turkey. Ottoman Turkish is a language barrier for most academics working in the field of media and communication studies. As a new initiative, this research is conducted by a communication scholar and an academic historian, expert in Ottoman history. This made the study an interdisciplinary work, seeking to contribute to an overlooked field. At this point, it would be fruitful to summarise how the treaty became prominent in the political and media agendas of post-WWI period.

II. Describing the Treaty of Sèvres and the Istanbul press in 1920:

This section consists of two sub-sections. First, a historical overview about the Treaty of Sèvres and its conditions will be explained. Then, the environment in the Istanbul press and the political stance of the newspapers selected for this research will be presented.

The Treaty of Sèvres:

The Allied Powers started negotiating on how to re-draw the map of the Ottoman Empire before its downfall. The agreements among

United Kingdom, France and Russia (such as the Istanbul Agreement, 1915; The London Agreement, 1915; and the Skyes-Picot Agreement, 1916) during World War I were the first signs of an upcoming devastating treaty for the future of the Ottoman Empire (Baytok, 2007). In 1920, the Greek advancement in Western Turkey reached even up to İzmit (near Istanbul). Following these, Sultan Vahdeddin sent a committee to Sèvres to sign the treaty. The treaty, including 433 articles, was signed on 10 August 1920. This detailed treaty was not only about the new political map of South Eastern Europe, Anatolia and the Middle East. It was even referring to protection of copyright violations in literature and arts (*Vakit*, 31 July 1920). The signatories were the Ottoman Empire, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Armenia, Belgium, Greece, the Kingdom of Hejaz, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Czechoslovakia.

It is important to explain what kind of sanctions this subversive treaty brings and how this treaty was going to change the map of Southeast Europe, Anatolia and the Middle East. First of all, Istanbul was going to stay under the control of Allied Powers. According to the Treaty, the Ottomans supposed to have only one gendarmerie regiment and a guards unit for the Sultan, to be stayed in the Golden Horn in Istanbul (Baytok, 2007). Besides, the Bosphorus strait and the Dardanelles were going to be administrated by a commission, formed by the Allied Powers. This meant that these two important water canals between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea were going to be always open for both trading vessels and warships. Even though the Treaty protected Istanbul as the capital of the Ottomans, there was a caveat to change this status if the Turks do not implement the articles of the Treaty (Yalçın et al., 2004). In addition to the Treaty of Sèvres, some economic sanctions and capitulations were also arranged for the benefits of the Allied Powers. These were agreed by Italy, France and the United Kingdom on a hidden treaty called "Accord Tripartite" (Baytok, 2007).

Damat Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier of Ottoman Empire during the Sèvres period, was confused because of the devastating articles in the Treaty. The ones related to Izmir (Smyrna) and the west coast of Anatolia were not acceptable for the Ottoman Committee in Sèvres (Baytok, 2007). The Treaty was barely transforming the Empire into a

small Asian principality. This was the end of a European giant which played an active political and cultural role in the southeast of Europe and in the Mediterranean region for more than 500 years (Yalçın et al., 2004). There was going to be no land left for Turks in the Thrace. Only the west of Istanbul until Büyükçekmece was going to be symbolically under Ottoman rule. All western, southern and eastern Anatolia supposed to be partitioned by the Allied Powers and their fellow nations. Izmir was a crucial port city of its time and it was left to Greeks in Sèvres. Only the land between middle Anatolia and the Black Sea coast was reserved for the Turks. In these intolerable circumstances for the Sublime Porte, Sultan Vahdeddin's all hair became white at one night after seeing what is written in the Treaty, as some rumours claim (Baytok, 2007).

Reactions against the Treaty:

The Treaty had to be accepted by each parties' national parliaments or other political institutions. Meclis-i Mebusan (The Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul) was already shut down on 18 Mart 1920 following the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Powers. The Parliament in Ankara was totally against the Treaty. Besides, it was also not signed by any state among the Allied Powers except Greece and Italy (Yalçın et al, 2004; Baytok, 2007). The reason of this situation is multi-dimensional. First of all, in Western European states' political agenda, the Sèvres was perceived as mostly an unjust treaty. Injustice was especially visible concerning the Greek occupation of Turkish west coast where was largely inhabited by Turks. This could create a long-term turmoil in the region in the future and this occupation was against Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, with the emphasis on *self-determination*, declared in 1918. Referring to Admiral Robeck, Lord Curzon once declared that the Greek occupation in Western Anatolia, where Turkish population is the majority, might transform into a cancer in the region in the long run (Yalçın et al., 2004). Secondly, the success of Turkish National Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal, against the Greeks increased the power of Turks for the future negotiations with the Allied Powers. In 1921, the representatives of the Government in Ankara were invited to a peace conference to Britain (the Conference of London). This invitation was a revolutionary development for the

emergence of Modern Turkey (Yalçın et al., 2004). All in all, the new circumstances did not allow the Treaty of Sèvres to come into force. It was not ratified in the Allied Power's national parliaments or other authorised bodies. Finally, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 proved the invalidity of Sèvres.

At this stage, it is also crucial to note that the Treaty of Sèvres served for an unexpected function. It made people in the Ottoman Empire more united. On the other side of the Aegean Sea, Eleftherios Venizelos -the then Prime Minister of Greece- announced the outcomes of the Treaty of Sèvres to his public. This good news for most Greeks in Athens was immediately heard in Anatolia. This was a remarkably motivating moment for Turks to fight together against the Allied Powers, especially the Greeks. The Istanbul press became more aware of what the Treaty means. Other papers, supporting Mustafa Kemal's movement in Anatolia, were harshly criticizing the possible outcomes of the Sèvres. All these events empowered the National Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal, and even the impact of the Sèvres lessen the clashes between the Sublime Porte and Ankara for the sake of Turkey's future (Yalçın et al., 2004). Moreover, following the shock of the Treaty of Sèvres, internal uprisings against the Ankara Government in the Marmara region, Düzce and Bolu became silent (Akşin, 2010).

The Istanbul Press in 1920:

Istanbul was under occupation of the Allied Powers between 1918 and 1923. Therefore, the circumstances in Istanbul for journalists should be evaluated within the 'occupation' environment. An esteemed Turkish press historian Hıfzı Topuz claims that the newspapers in Istanbul during that period were divided into 3 groups. The first group was the ones which support the National Movement in Anatolia, and accordingly the Ankara Government. The papers in this group were *İleri*, *Yeni Gün*, *Akşam* and *Vakit*. On the opposite, papers such as *Peyam-i Sabah*, *Alemdar* and *Türkçe İstanbul* was supporting the Sublime Porte and being totally against the government in Ankara. The third group was including the papers which have sympathy for the National Movement in Anatolia but still acting cautiously (Topuz, 2003). It would be beneficial to focus on four important papers of this

term, as they constitute the research sample of the study. Topuz (2003) explains these newspapers as follows:

Akşam:

Akşam was founded by four young journalists at the end of WWI. The paper was interested in the political events in Istanbul in 1919 and 1920. It was not usually focusing on what was happening in Anatolia during that time. *Akşam* started publishing the victories of the National Movement after 1921.

Alemdar:

Alemdar was established in 1911. During the time of British occupation of Istanbul, the paper was in favour of British or American mandate government for Turkey. The paper was harshly against 'the Committee of Union and Progress' and also against the National Movement in Anatolia.

Peyam-i Sabah:

This newspaper had been published by a contentious personality, Ali Kemal. Being the great-grandfather of London Mayor Boris Johnson, Ali Kemal was an active journalist and politician. He was famous with his striking comments such as "the British nation is the most hardworking nation of the world. We have two political principles for the Ottoman Empire. The first is the unity of nations inside the empire, and the second has to do with the good fellowship with the British" (Topuz, 2003: 107). The paper was totally against the National Movement. Ali Kemal himself was especially critical about Mustafa Kemal and he was seeing him more dangerous than the Greeks.

Vakit:

Founded in 1917 by Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888-1971) and Mehmet Asım Us (1884-1967). It was possible to see in the coverage that *Vakit* supports Mustafa Kemal's movement in Anatolia. Therefore, Yalman was punished in Istanbul and he was sent into exile to Malta in 1920.

Having presented brief information about the Treaty of Sèvres and the Istanbul press of 1920, the following section will be explaining

how the research sample is designed and what kind of method this study employs.

III. Scope and Method:

The study's research sample consists of four newspapers, published in Istanbul during the year 1920. These four papers are *Akşam*, *Alemdar*, *Peyam-ı Sabah* and *Vakit*. Among several other titles of Istanbul press in 1920, these papers were chosen according to their political stance. In order to make it a politically balanced sample, *Akşam* and *Vakit* was chosen to represent the pro-Ankara Government camp while *Alemdar* and *Peyam-ı Sabah* was selected to represent the papers which are in favour of the Istanbul Government. All news items published in these papers in 1920 were scanned. The ones referring to the Treaty of Sèvres were selected for the research sample. In total forty three news items were included in the study (*Akşam*: 10, *Alemdar*: 3, *Peyam-ı Sabah*: 5, *Vakit*: 25). The microfilm archive of Anadolu University was used to collect the material.

Turkey started using the Latin alphabet in 1928. Therefore, Turkish papers in Istanbul in 1920 were publishing in Ottoman Turkish, written by Arabic letters. Not only the alphabet is different than contemporary Turkish, also the language itself consists of so many Arabic and Persian words. Besides, in some cases, the structure of sentences was also slightly different than modern Turkish. All these material collected from the Istanbul press were translated into today's Turkish by one of the researchers. Following this, the text material gathered from the papers was analysed by using Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) of Critical Discourse Analysis. Five categories were formed according to Reisigl and Wodak's (2009) discursive strategies in order to perform the analysis. The categories, based on their strategies are 'Referential/Nomination', 'Predication', 'Argumentation', 'Perspectivisation', and 'Intensification/Mitigation'. More details about what kind of objectives and devices these strategies include can be seen in Table 1. While the news texts were analysed by using these categories, the main research question was always born in mind: 'How did the Istanbul press of 1920 represent the Treaty of Sèvres?' It is crucial at this point to discuss Critical Discourse Analysis and Discourse-Historical Approach to make the methodological understanding of this study clear.

Table 1. A Selection of Discursive Strategies

Referential/ Nomination	Construction of ingroups and outgroups. Discursive construction of social actors, events, processes	Membership categorization devices, metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches
Predication/ Labelling	Labelling social actors, objects, events, processes	Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g. adjectives, relative clauses, prepositional phrases, infinitive clauses), explicit comparisons, allusions, evocations, presuppositions
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	Topoi, fallacies, and counterfactuals used to justify inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment
Perspectivization	Positioning writer's approach	Reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances
Intensification/ Mitigation	Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the epistemic status of a proposition	Modal particles, tag questions, subjunctive, hesitations, vague expressions, etc. Indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead of assertion) Verbs of saying, feeling, thinking, etc.

Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is employed as a method in the empirical part of the research. DHA originates from the works of the Vienna School. It is becoming more popular among the studies benefiting from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It is important at this stage to explain how this study defines CDA and explains DHA.

'Discourse' is a very popular notion in academic studies even though

it has started to be remarkably misused word (Richardson, 2007: 21). To summarise its meaning for this study, it would be useful to draw to Fairclough & Wodak's explanation and how Tekin explains it:

“CDA sees discourse –language use in speech and writing– as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. To put the same point in a different way, discourse is socially *constitutive* as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objective knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258 cited in Tekin, 2010: 16).

Within this understanding of CDA, this study requires to find the most appropriate method to explore a historical event in a series of newspaper, published almost 100 years ago. There is no one clear way of choosing a standard method in most studies of social sciences. Each study has its own dynamics and a particular way should be found to reach more reliable findings. The existing literature and experiences from previous research projects cannot automatically depict the best way to reach the aims of the study. However, benefiting from previous studies can guide the researcher to find the most appropriate method. According to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 23) “there is neither any guiding theoretical viewpoint that is used coherently within CDA, nor do the CDA protagonists proceed consistently from the area of theory to the field of discourse and text, and back to theory”. However, there are different research strategies employed by CDA experts in the past. DHA is one of these to follow. In Tekin's words, DHA “goes beyond textual analysis, pays particular attention to the historical setting of discourse, and introduces a socio-cognitive level. It understands discourse as a text in context, not isolated in space and thus incorporates two central concepts [‘intertextuality’ and ‘interdiscursivity’]” (Tekin, 2008: 733). To unveil the method in a less abstract way, Reisigl and Wodak's (2009: 94) five discursive strategies below can help to show how this study performs DHA as a method to focus on news reports published in the Istanbul Press of 1920. Having employed the strategies below, it can be argued that the methodology of DHA is based on

an abductive approach (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 30). However, the researcher can go back to data throughout the analysis process.

VI. Findings:

This section will present the empirical findings of the study by using the discursive strategies (shown on Table 1 above) as a tool of analysis.

Referential/Nomination:

The general tone of Istanbul papers in 1920 does not have any consideration to employ an unbiased language. Some papers clearly employ the 'we' pronoun and 'our' possessive pronoun to show its support for the Istanbul Government. In some cases, the pronoun is also employed to reveal the degree of 'togetherness' within the country to protect themselves from the Western powers. However, it is also a sign of overlooking the government in Ankara. The excerpt below is an example of how these pronouns were used in the Istanbul press to create ingroups and outgroups:

"Our committee departed to Versailles by a private train. Many people came to Sirkeci Train Station to say 'good bye' to passengers of this Paris journey." (*Vakit*, 2 May 1920)

This excerpt can be evaluated within the demarcation between Istanbul and Ankara governments of that time. The Istanbul Press' stance is mostly on the side of the Government in Istanbul. However, the conditions change by time and their view to the Parliament in Ankara became much tolerating. This tendency reveals itself in summer 1920. The time for signing the Treaty was approaching in July and *Akşam* newspaper implicitly highlights the time for cooperation because the danger may hit two governments at the same time:

"According to the information coming from Paris, if Turkey does not accept signing the Treaty without any changes, the Allied Powers will declare war against both Istanbul and Ankara governments without making any differentiation." (*Akşam*, 13 July 1920)

This view continues on *Akşam* after inking the Treaty. This time the topic was a general amnesty for the members of Ankara Government. The paper refers to the efforts of Lütfi Fikri Bey who was going to

provide a peace between Istanbul and Ankara governments (*Akşam*, 7 October 1920). However, the main aim of this peace was sustaining a suitable environment in Anatolia to enforce the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

There is also a religious way of ingroup/outgroup differentiation and it is strangely related to southern Asia. In general, it can be claimed that Turkish people's historical relationship with Indian Muslims is relatively weak, compared to their relationship with Muslims of the Middle East and Western Asia. In the conditions of Sèvres, the Istanbul papers gladly mentions the support from Indian Muslims. This is an immense motivation for a lonely Empire in decay and near to be partitioned by European powers.

"Following the submission of the Treaty text to our [Turkish] representatives in Versailles, the Governor-General of India published a declaration for the Muslims of his country. The Governor asked the people to trust them and be sure that the British Government will protect the rights of Muslims. Besides, according to some rumours, an Indian Muslim committee was planning to talk to British and French authorities to request a more acceptable Treaty for the Ottomans." (*Akşam*, 27 May 1920)

Predication/Labelling:

The Istanbul press of 1920 does not present a heavy labelled language. The coverage rarely employs adjectives and the events are usually represented without deep emotions. When it comes to labelling, the most striking example in the coverage is related to Turkey's own name. It was found in the coverage that the name 'Ottoman Empire' and 'Turkey' was being used interchangeably. Even though the official date for the birth of Turkey is 29 October 1923, the name Turkey was already a common usage for the Istanbul press. Besides, 'Turkey' was never used to emphasise the differences between Ankara and Istanbul governments. The emerging political structure in Ankara was usually predicated as 'the Ankara government' or 'Mustafa Kemal's army forces'. On the other hand, Ottoman Empire was usually defined with the terms 'the Istanbul Government', 'the Palace', and 'the Sublime Porte'. The example below shows how Ot-

toman Empire was also called Turkey in the Istanbul Press of 1920:

"Different than the Grand Vizier's previous text, this time Turkish representatives brought a different contract with themselves. The difference was Turkey's will to protect its power on the islands of Lemnos, İmroz (Gökçeada) and Bozcaada." (*Akşam*, 6 July 1920)

More important point for this study's research problem is how the Treaty of Sèvres was represented and predicated. On 20 May 1920, *Peyam-ı Sabah* paper defines the situation as a 'sad text'. It was the period of negotiations but how the Treaty was going to be shaped was becoming obvious day by day. The paper was citing the telegraph message for the Sublime Porte, sent by Tevfik Pasha, one of the members of Turkish committee in Paris. The paper explained the condition as an 'upcoming disaster' for Turkey (*Peyam-ı Sabah*, 20 May 1920).

The most striking example in the findings is how Admiral Esref Pasha defined the Treaty of Sèvres. He was the member of Turkish committee which was sent to Paris for early negotiations. On 30 May 1920, *Akşam* Newspaper reported Esref Pasha's feelings. He was disappointed with the conditions proposed in the negotiations. Even though he was still hopeful for some changes in the Treaty, his views on the existing Treaty, proposed by the Allied Powers, was disappointing for the future of Turkey. *Akşam* argues:

"Esref Pasa believes that the Turkish committee in Paris cannot sacrifice Izmir and Trakya (Thrace). If they cannot succeed to make some changes, this treaty will have a 'death sentence' character and this cannot be accepted." (*Akşam*, 30 May 1920)

At the beginning of August 1920, the framework of the Treaty was almost drawn. Telegraphs arriving Istanbul was indicating that the signing ceremony might happen anytime soon. On 2 August 1920, *Vakit* newspaper defined the situation as 'national mourning'. An announcement was inviting people to participate in the mourning on the day of signing the Treaty. The paper underlines that there will be '*salat-ü selam*' prayers at every mosque in Istanbul and people will give up working on the day of mourning (*Vakit*, 2 August 1920). This is a type of prayer that is mostly read to pray for Prophet Mohammed and read during funeral ceremonies. Therefore, the tone of the news report reveals that the conditions of the Treaty was remarkably heavy

for the Ottomans and now there is a mood of death in Istanbul where there is no option other than praying for the future of the country.

The naming 'Treaty of Sèvres' was rarely mentioned in the reports. Instead of Sèvres, the word of 'Treaty' or the city Paris was usually highlighted when the report was referring to the negotiations or a signed agreement. The title of the Treaty became clear at the end of summer 1920 in Istanbul press and some news reports, especially *Vakit*, mentioned the label 'Sèvres' in August and September.

Argumentation:

The Istanbul press published argumentations based on inevitable circumstances. Quoting Lütfi Fikri Bey, a former MP, a news report on *Akşam* Newspaper argues that the peace is possible if only the articles of the Treaty of Sèvres are frankly and faithfully enforced. Lütfi Fikri Bey believes that the only thing Anatolia requires is silence and peace. He thinks that if the Ankara Government accepts the conditions of Sèvres, the problems in Anatolia will only be internal (*Akşam*, 7 October 1920). In this view, the argumentation is based on the possible positive results of Sèvres, such as peace. In another example, by quoting the reactions of France, the Istanbul press makes an equation. This equation argues that if the Istanbul Government cannot sustain quietness in Anatolia, the military operations of Allied Powers will carry on. It is clearly understood here that rejecting the devastating conditions of the Sèvres cannot bring peace, as *Akşam* argues (*Akşam*, 2 October 1920).

Similarly, *Vakit* newspaper referred to Eleftherios Venizelos, the then Prime Minister of Greece, and argued that the Allied Powers will not stop fighting if the Nationalist Movement, led by Mustafa Kemal, does not calm down. According to Venizelos, the punishment for the Ankara Governments' deeds should be exportation of Turks from Istanbul. He believes that the Greek Army in Anatolia is capable of executing these plans (*Vakit*, 12 September 1920). Another report on *Vakit* mentioned the Greek Interior Minister's argument. According to him, the Greek army will advance in Western Anatolia if Turkey does not have power to enforce the conditions of the Treaty. Besides, a Greek general claimed that two or three

weeks would be enough to destroy Mustafa Kemal's Army (*Vakit*, 28 September 1920).

All these examples show that the Istanbul Press acted hopeless and evaluated the Treaty as an inevitable consequence. The general usage of language and how the quotations were made in the reports motivate the reader to think that there is no other way than accepting the Treaty and executing its subversive conditions.

Intensification/Mitigation and Perspectivisation:

News writing style of that time in the Istanbul press is usually not interested in details. The reports are mostly short and they include remarkably general information about the events. However, some examples are opposite to this overall characteristic. For instance, *Vakit* newspaper employs intensified details while explaining the departure ceremony for the Turkish committee at Sirkeci Train Station in Istanbul. It was mentioned in the report that the train would have two servants during the journey. Besides, the train will pass through Belgrade, Trieste, Milan, and will reach Paris via Switzerland (*Vakit*, 30 April 1920). Again, another report published by *Vakit* refers to twenty five big boxes for documents bringing from Istanbul to Paris. Besides, the good-bye ceremony was explained with emotions. It is claimed that Tefvik Pasha and his colleagues did not stop saluting people until their train disappeared on the horizon (*Vakit*, 2 May 1920).

The Istanbul press employed mitigations several times to represent the upcoming treaty with a tone of euphemism. This was performed by the signature day of the Treaty. For instance, on 7 August 1920, three days before the Treaty was signed, *Vakit* newspaper refers to the glorious past of the Ottomans and how big the Ottoman Empire was during Suleiman the Magnificent's and Selim I's (Yavuz) reigns. The same paper continues to try to sustain a peaceful environment before the big storm starts and mentions the venue of the ceremony. This was an absurd coverage within the circumstances of the tense moment just two days before the signature ceremony. According to the paper, the signing ceremony will be at the museum in Sèvres and the committees will enter the palace through the big gate. The representation of the Treaty in this example probably serves to the Sublime Porte's

plans to ease the existing panic in Istanbul. One would expect to be informed by the proposed articles of the Treaty during these tense moments instead of fancy details of the venue.

The period after signing the Treaty could not change the soft reactions of the Istanbul press. The conditions of the Treaty was an enormous burden on the Ottomans but the press was still writing about the technical process that is going to be followed after the Treaty. On 12 August 1920, *Akşam* Newspaper underlines the importance of how the Treaty is going to be enforced in Turkey. The paper explains the necessary work for different ministries and how they can cooperate to execute the requirements of Sèvres (*Akşam*, 12 August 1920).

As an example for perspectivisation, Istanbul papers sometimes refer to important politicians' opinions. *Peyam-ı Sabah* quotes from Osman Rıfat Pasha. His perspective is based on the importance of the public's right to follow what is going on with the Treaty:

"The Government fulfils its duty to inform the public on every issue related to the Treaty. If the public is aware of the reality, they will act reasonable..." (*Peyam-ı Sabah*, 22 May 1920)

This was a remarkably advanced view about acquisition of knowledge when it is evaluated within the circumstances of its time. At least on the discursive level, an Ottoman Minister of 1920, Osman Rıfat Pasha cares about the public view and the public's right to know what is happening for the future of their country.

V. Conclusion:

Looking at media history is an important way to better understand the political history. "Reports of the day generally only provide summary accounts and (partial) explanations of events. This does not devalue them nor does it minimise their long-term significance in creating public 'knowledge' and 'memories' about events." (Negrine, 2013). Drawing into Negrine's view, this study looked at the representation of the Treaty of Sèvres in the Istanbul press of 1920. By taking into account their political stance, four papers were included in the research sample. The analyses were conducted by employing Discourse-Historical Approach of Critical Discourse Analysis. Five discursive strategies were employed as tools for categories of the analyses.

It was found in the research sample that most news reports in the sample were written by using telegraph messages received from France. The length of reports was remarkably different. However, the majority of news items were short compared to contemporary average political news publishing style. There were several routine news reports referring to only the ceremonial welcoming or good-byes for the Turkish committee going to Paris. The structure of news reports is far different than today's newspapers. The reports mostly look like an announcement and sometimes the reports were even published without a proper headline. Besides, some look like an official letter from the Sublime Porte or other officials from the Allied Powers.

The overall tone of the reports can be evaluated as silent, weak and demotivated compared to the possible impact of the Treaty to Turkey. The papers of Istanbul did not publish reports or commentaries with deep analysis to reflect the view of people who were not happy with the Treaty. The main reason behind this has to do with the general characteristic of Istanbul press in that period. The newspapers in Istanbul in late 1910s and early 1920s were by and large under the influence of the Sublime Porte and they were not able to perform explicit critiques against the Treaty which was signed by the Palace's representatives. Besides, Istanbul was under British occupation in that time and it was inevitable for the Istanbul press not to be influenced by this environment. The two papers, which have a better view about the Ankara Government, published reports with more emphasis on the devastating impact of the Treaty.

All in all, the study showed that the Istanbul press intensifies less necessary topics in the reports to overlook the important ones. Also, the reports mitigate the crucial points of the Treaty to sustain a better-looking political environment for its readers. The most disappointing view of the Istanbul press showed itself in the argumentation strategy category. It was found that the Istanbul press employs a language based on inevitable realities and these have to do with accepting the heavy burden of the Treaty. The representation of the events after signing the Treaty and the hopeless approach of important politicians and bureaucrats, highlighted in the news reports, represented the Treaty of Sèvres as the only option of Turkey's future. However, the Istanbul press missed three points in the post-Sèvres

period. First, the political agenda of the Allied powers in their home countries was tired of fighting and this was going to be an enormous plus for Turkey's ability to cope with the Sèvres. Secondly, the discussions in the West that it was not fair to overlook Turkish reality in most parts of Anatolia where Turkish population was by far more than Greeks. Thirdly, the Istanbul press did not portray enough the National Movement's civil and military actions in Anatolia and overlooked the potential of Mustafa Kemal. Consequently, even though the Treaty of Sèvres transformed into a dead born treaty shortly after its signature ceremony, this cannot change its strong content and reality. Its existence still has power to be mentioned in today's politics and it is one of the most important reasons of Euroscepticism or anti-Americanism in modern day Turkey.

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